The RBI should sell dollars from its reserves only to smooth out sharp volatility in the rupee, but not fight a fundamental exchange rate adjustment.
May 17, 2012:
The dollar-rupee exchange rate has been the centre of attention in the
recent period. Top policymakers have been advocating defence of the
present exchange rate and they are opposed to any further depreciation.
The stemming of the rupee rate from further depreciation is implicitly
based on the premise that the present exchange rate is viable and can be
easily defended.
To assess the viability of the present dollar-rupee exchange rate, it is
necessary to review the external payments position of India. The
balance of payments current account deficit (CAD) in 2011-12 is
estimated to be well over 4 per cent of GDP.
While we could, with bravado, dismiss the international rating agencies
downgrading of India, there is no gainsaying that the lower rating would
eventually reduce the confidence of investors, and unless we take
strong remedial action, we could well see an unprecedented exodus of
capital.
India's inflation rate has been, for quite some time, well above that in
other emerging market economies (EMEs). The hope that our inflation
rate will be on the downtrend is an article of faith. The overall
political economy situation also does not generate confidence for
foreign investors.
Fall in forex reserves
The foreign exchange reserves, which provided considerable comfort to
investors, are now showing some signs of stress. With the volume of
transactions rising rapidly, the forex reserves have fallen over the
peak. The forex reserves are now equivalent to only 88 per cent of the
external debt.
Furthermore, the short-term debt is 40 per cent of total external debt. A
large part of the short-term debt comes up for refinancing in the
period up to September 2012 and it is unlikely that refinancing will be
possible at reasonable rates of interest.
In the recent period, the Reserve Bank of India has gone into overdrive
to defend the rupee. These measures are reminiscent of the 1990s when
administrative measures were taken to support the rupee. In the recent
period, exporters have been required to repatriate 50 per cent of export
earnings. Those holding Export Earners Foreign Currency (EEFC) accounts
are expected to fully draw down their balances in these accounts before
entering the forex market for purchases. Furthermore, controls have
been imposed on forward market activity.
Top policymakers have explicitly pronounced that the forex reserves should be used to prevent any further depreciation.
Given the delicately balanced political economy situation, the
authorities would not want critics pointing to the exchange rate
management as being deficient. India Inc. has, all along, advocated a
strong rupee or, in other words, cheaper imports. The adjustment then
falls on the export sector. It bears stressing that export subsidy in
terms of lower interest rates is an inefficient alternative to a
reasonable exchange rate.
Exchange rate adjustment
Advocates of a strong rupee would claim that we have experienced a
sustained increase in productivity while the rest of the world is
lagging. Such ideas stir our macho spirits but are dangerous as they can
lead to inappropriate exchange rate policies.
Now what can one make of the recent exchange management? In terms of the
6 currency real effective exchange rate (REER), the rupee appreciated
by 19.5 per cent between September 2009 and July 2011, and then
depreciated by 10.4 per cent between August 2011 and March 2012; the
exchange rate depreciation in April and May 2012 probably implies that
the appreciation up to July 2011 has been clawed back.
Ideally, the RBI's policy should be to aggressively buy when the rupee
is appreciating excessively and sell when the rupee is depreciating
excessively. Refraining from purchases on the upswing of the rupee but
expending the reserves on the downswing would, over time, deplete the
reserves.
Inflation rate differentials
If one wishes to move away from the REER, then the nominal dollar-rupee rate could be tracked over a longer period.
In March 1993, when the dual exchange rate was given up and a unitary
market-determined rate was introduced, the rate stabilised for quite
some time at $1= Rs 31.37.
Given that the secular inflation rate in India is at least 4 per cent
per annum higher in India than in the US, the exchange rate should
reflect relative inflation rate differentials and the exchange rate
should now be around $1= Rs 66. Talk of a depreciation of the rupee to
Rs 66 would be considered as blasphemy in official circles as also by
India Inc.
If we want to avoid fundamental distortions in the economy, one of the prerequisites would be an appropriate exchange rate.
One recognises the danger of self-fulfilling prophecies, but the least
the RBI should do in the immediate future would be to smooth out sharp
volatility, but not fight a fundamental exchange rate adjustment.
To that extent, the RBI should intervene strongly by purchase in the
forex market when the rupee appreciates, but undertake limited sales
only to avoid excessive depreciation.
The problem is that political economy considerations would not allow the appropriate exchange rate adjustment to take place.
This could be unfortunate as monetary policy cannot bear the burden of
fiscal imbalances as well as a fundamental disequilibrium in the
exchange rate. In the absence of effective policy adjustment, India
would face a sharp increase in inflation and a lower growth rate.
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/s-s-tarapore/article3429055.ece

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